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OPINION OF THE COURT
             
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal asks us to consider the circumstances in
which a purchaser of assets bears liability for delinquent
employee benefit fund contributions under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) as a successor in
interest to the seller of those assets.  Appellant William J.
Einhorn, on behalf of employee benefit funds established
pursuant to ERISA, brought suit to recover unpaid contributions
from Appellee M.L. Ruberton Construction Company. 
According to Einhorn, Ruberton was obligated to contribute to
the benefit funds under two collective bargaining agreements as
a successor employer to the original signatory, Statewide Hi-
 We set forth only those facts that are relevant to our1
holding. As discussed below, because we will remand this case to
the District Court to resolve disputed issues with respect to
Ruberton’s continuation of Statewide’s business, we need not go
into great detail here.
3
Way Safety, Inc.  The District Court applied the traditional
common law rule of successorship liability, found that Ruberton
was not a continuation of Statewide, and granted Ruberton’s
motion for summary judgment.  Einhorn appeals.1
I.
Einhorn is the Administrator of the Teamsters Pension
Trust Fund and Welfare Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity
(collectively, “the Funds”).  The Funds are multiemployer
benefit plans established pursuant to various provisions of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and Section 302(c)(5) of the
Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. §
186(c)(5).
Statewide, a highway construction company with
facilities in New Jersey, plays an integral role in the dispute,
although it is not a party to this lawsuit.  Under two collective
bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with Teamsters Local Union
No. 676, Statewide was required to make contributions to the
Funds.
In 2005, Statewide faced a series of financial hardships
and the prospect of being debarred from public contract work in
New Jersey based on allegations of fraud.  Meanwhile, the Funds
began an audit of Statewide’s payroll records, which revealed
delinquencies owed under the aforementioned CBAs.  The
delinquencies, including liquidated damages, totaled close to
$600,000.
Around this time Ruberton, a general construction
company, learned of Statewide’s financial difficulties and
entered into negotiations with Statewide for Ruberton’s purchase
of Statewide’s assets.  Local 676 learned of the potential
transaction and filed suit for an injunction because it feared that
 The only liability of Statewide’s that Ruberton expressly2
assumed during the sale was an outstanding balance of $160,000
4
Ruberton, a non-union employer, would not agree to become
party to Statewide’s CBAs.  The District Court issued a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining consummation of
the sale.  Soon after the TRO was issued, negotiations began
among Local 676, Statewide, and Ruberton, this time with the
union’s rights represented.
At the first meeting, Einhorn discussed Statewide’s
delinquent contributions to the Funds with Statewide’s Principal
Officer George Smith Jr. and Ruberton’s President Andrew
Berenato.  Berenato testified that at that meeting he heard
Einhorn tell Smith that Statewide owed the Funds “about a half a
million dollars.”  App. at 169.  Some days later, there was a
second meeting among the same individuals.
According to Berenato, Ruberton’s principal objective
during the second meeting, since they “knew there was a
problem with Statewide and the Funds,” was to ensure that
Ruberton “would not be held the successor to them and liable for
that debt.”  App. at 166.  For his part, Einhorn aimed to protect
the Funds’ interest in delinquent and future contributions.  Local
676 sought to ensure that Ruberton would hire its workers
hitherto employed by Statewide, rather than continuing to use
non-union workers.  By the end of this meeting, two agreements
were executed.
The first agreement, between Local 676 and Statewide,
guaranteed that the union would dismiss the injunction suit
without prejudice, and Statewide promised to cooperate fully
with the Funds’ payroll audit and to timely remit all future
contributions.  The second agreement, between Local 676 and
Ruberton, provided that Ruberton would hire, subject to its work
needs, the existing workforce of Statewide covered by the
existing CBA, that such employment would be governed by that
CBA on an interim basis, and a newly negotiated CBA would
cover all Ruberton employees.  Neither agreement addressed
Ruberton’s potential successor liability to the Funds for the
delinquent contributions.2
that Statewide owed on some heavy equipment.
 Such assets included office equipment, furnishings and3
fixtures, machinery, vehicles, construction equipment, access to all
sales and business records and information, access to Statewide’s
telephone/facsimile numbers, rights under all leases for equipment,
permits, licenses, franchises, etc., and Statewide’s inventory.
Statewide kept its accounts receivable, which amounted to more
than $5 million.
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Four days after the second meeting, on October 10, 2005,
Statewide sold its assets to Ruberton for $1.6 million in cash.  3
Ruberton began making contributions to the Funds in December
that year.  Simultaneous with the sale, a real estate holding
company related to Ruberton, RAL Real Estate, L.L.C., leased
Statewide’s facility in Folsom, New Jersey.  Under the lease
agreement another entity related to Ruberton, Brianna L.L.C.,
thereafter exercised its option to purchase the facility from
Statewide and leased the facility to Ruberton.  Ruberton hired
more than half of Statewide’s former employees in the months
following the sale, including its Vice President and thirty-three
percent shareholder, and took over several of Statewide’s
projects.  Approximately two months after the sale, Ruberton
auctioned off many of the assets it had purchased from Statewide
that were not used in the expanded operations, realizing just
more than $600,000.
Statewide remained in business for some time after the
asset sale using subcontractors to provide the necessary
equipment and labor.  Ruberton was one such subcontractor,
billing Statewide more than $400,000 for rented employees and
equipment.  In January 2006, Statewide ceased all field
operations.  A shareholder from Statewide retained an office at
the site now occupied by Ruberton to wind down the business. 
Ruberton’s profits increased as a result of the sale and the
company is still engaged in the highway construction business.
On December 13, 2005, Einhorn filed an action against
Statewide and Ruberton.  Einhorn alleged that Statewide owed
the Funds pursuant to the operative CBAs and that Ruberton
owed the Funds as a successor in interest to Statewide.  The
 During the proceedings, Ruberton filed a third-party4
complaint against its former counsel Ronald L. Tobia and David
M. DeClement alleging malpractice. The District Court stayed the
third-party action pending disposition of this appeal.
 As noted by the District Court, as of October 2008,5
Statewide had at least fifteen judgments entered against it and less
than $250 in its bank accounts.
 The District Court granted Ruberton’s motion to certify as6
a final judgment the summary judgment order under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(b).  In the absence of certification, Ruberton’s unresolved
legal malpractice claims against its former attorneys would have
precluded appealability.
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parties reached a settlement agreement on March 16, 2006,
wherein Statewide agreed to pay the delinquent contributions in
a series of installments.  Statewide breached the settlement
agreement and Einhorn filed the present action against Ruberton
in June 2006.   The following week, Einhorn obtained a4
judgment against Statewide in the prior suit for the breach,
which Einhorn has been unable to enforce.5
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. §§
1132, 185(a), as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.6
We exercise de novo review of the District Court’s
resolution of the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. 
See Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2008). 
Similarly, we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
“choice and interpretation of legal precepts.”  Am. Soc’y for
Testing v. Corrpro Cos., Inc., 478 F.3d 557, 566 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citation and quotations omitted).
III.
At issue in this appeal is whether Ruberton may be held
liable for Statewide’s debts to the Funds under a theory of
7successor liability.  It is settled that successor liability may be
imposed for delinquent ERISA fund contributions in the context
of a merger.  Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Phila. & Vicinity
v. Littlejohn, 155 F.3d 206, 208-10 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that
under the federal common law, the surviving entity in a merger
is liable for the debts of the predecessor regardless of whether
the successor had pre-merger notice of such debts).  As the
District Court found and is undisputed by the parties, however,
the transaction between Statewide and Ruberton was not a
merger.  Rather, the transaction here was one in which a
corporate entity bought the assets of another corporate entity. 
Liability under that situation is not well settled.
At the District Court, both parties assumed that the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Upholsterers’ Int’l Union Pension
Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir.
1990), provided the applicable rule of law in the case.  Artistic
Furniture held that a successor purchaser of assets may be liable
for the seller’s delinquent ERISA fund contributions to vindicate
important federal statutory policy where the buyer had notice of
the liability prior to the sale and there was sufficient evidence of
“continuity of operations” between the entities.  Id. at 1327-29. 
In so holding, the Seventh Circuit departed from the general
common law rule that an entity that purchases the assets of
another does not assume the seller’s liabilities unless one of the
following exceptions applies: the purchaser expressly or
impliedly assumed liability; the transaction amounted to a de
facto merger; the purchasing corporation is a mere continuation
of the seller; or the transfer of assets was for the fraudulent
purpose of escaping liability for unpaid debts.   Id. at 1325-26.
The District Court declined to follow the expanded
successorship doctrine espoused by the Seventh Circuit in
Artistic Furniture.  Guided by this court’s precedents, the
District Court distinguished Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB,
414 U.S. 168 (1973), upon which the Seventh Circuit relied in
Artistic Furniture.  The District Court interpreted our prior
decision in Littlejohn to hold that universal concepts of corporate
law supplied the federal common law rule of successor liability
in the present ERISA case.  Because the District Court found
that none of the exceptions permitting liability applied, it granted
8Ruberton’s motion for summary judgment.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “striking a
balance between the conflicting legitimate interests of the bona
fide successor, the public, and the affected employee[s]” to
effectuate national labor policy “is often a difficult and delicate
responsibility.”   Golden State, 414 U.S. at 181 (citations and
quotations omitted); see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936,
944 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that successor liability is “dreadfully
tangled, reflecting the difficulty of striking the right balance
between the competing interests at stake”).  While this court
appreciates the District Court’s efforts to balance the interests,
like the Seventh Circuit we “feel constrained to disagree with its
ruling that labor law successorship principles cannot support the
imposition of liability upon [Ruberton].”  Artistic Furniture, 920
F.2d at 1325.
Federal courts beginning with Golden State have
developed a federal common law successorship doctrine
imposing liability upon successors beyond the confines of the
common law rule when necessary to protect important
employment-related policies.  See Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician
Servs., Inc., 360 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2004).  In Golden State,
the Supreme Court held that the purchaser of a business could be
held liable under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)
for remedying the seller’s unlawful discharge of an employee
where the successor employer had notice of the unfair practice
and “continued, without interruption or substantial change, the
predecessor’s business operations.”  414 U.S. at 184.  The
remedy required that the successor reinstate the employee with
back pay.
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Golden State that
the successor company “was not party to the unfair labor
practices” and now “operate[s] the business without any
connection with his predecessor.”  Id. at 171 n.2 (quotations
omitted).  Nonetheless, it stated, other factors must be taken into
account when balancing the equities.  Among those equities is
that the successor “is generally in the best position to remedy”
the violation and, because notice is required, potential liability
“can be reflected in the price [the successor] pays for the
 See, e.g., Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843 (9th Cir.7
1995) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Artistic Furniture, 920 F.2d
1323 (ERISA); Criswell v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1093
(9th Cir. 1989) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Sec’y of
Labor v. Mullins, 888 F.2d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Mine Safety and
Health Act); Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 (Pregnancy Discrimination
Act); Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985) (42
U.S.C. § 1981); Bates v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 744 F.2d 705 (9th Cir.
1984) (Title VII).
 Other circuits have extended successor liability to Title VII8
violations as well.  See, e.g., Rojas v. TK Commc’ns, Inc., 87 F.3d
745 (5th Cir. 1996); Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228
(7th Cir. 1986); In re Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 700 F.2d 695 (11th Cir.
1983); Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., Inc., 694 F.2d 221 (10th Cir.
1982); EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d
1086 (6th Cir. 1974).
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business, or [the successor] may secure an indemnity clause in
the sales contract.”  Id. (quotations omitted).  Moreover,
throughout its analysis, the Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of providing “protection for the victimized
employee” without a remedy against the now defunct
predecessor entity.  Id. at 181.
As noted by the Seventh Circuit, Golden State laid the
foundation for a series of cases in this court and others that
expanded successorship liability in the labor field holding that
labor policies have superseded the competing interest of fluidity
of corporate assets reflected in the common law rule.  Artistic
Furniture, 920 F.2d at 1326-27.   7
This court, following Golden State, has extended the
labor law successorship doctrine to employment discrimination
claims under Title VII.  See Brzozowski, 360 F.3d 173; Rego v.
ARC Water Treatment Co. of Pa., 181 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1999).  8
In Brzozowski, the plaintiff brought an action against her former
employer alleging gender discrimination that resulted in
$150,000 of damages.  360 F.3d at 175-76.  When the plaintiff
realized that the company was insolvent, she asserted a claim
against the successor who had purchased the company’s assets. 
 We realize that here the liability lies close to $1 million.9
While this is greater than the successor liability imposed in the
cases relied upon, this fact alone does not dictate whether liability
is fair.  In Golden State, the successor was required to pay four
years of backpay for one employee.  414 U.S. at 187 n.9.  If
multiple employees had been implicated in unfair labor practices,
multi-year salaries could have imposed a hefty sum and nothing in
the Supreme Court’s analysis would have precluded successor
liability for multiple employees so long as there was notice.  In
Brzozowski, the plaintiff claimed $150,000 in damages for just one
employee.  Here, there are a number of plan beneficiaries who
stand to be harmed.  The record demonstrates that the asset sale has
been lucrative for Ruberton’s business.  Ruberton’s business
acumen serves not as a basis for punishment as it asserts, but rather
a factor to be taken into account when balancing the equities.
10
Id.  
Taking into consideration the three principal factors
applicable to successor liability in the employment
discrimination context, we found that imposition of successor
liability was appropriate because the successor was on notice,
there was sufficient continuity of operations and workforce, and
the predecessor was unable to provide adequate relief.  Id. at
178.  We considered the balance of equities and “the prime
consideration” of fairness.  Id.  The successor-employer had
ample opportunity to insulate itself from liability during the
negotiations.  Indeed, the sales agreement included an indemnity
clause disclaiming the successor’s liability for certain law suits
and EEOC claims.  Id. at 175.
Our cases extending successorship liability from the
NLRA to the Title VII context suggest important principles. 
First, we have not confined the theory of successor liability after
an asset sale to the NLRA context, but have extended it to other
contexts based on the balance of equities.  Second, the
imposition of a financial burden on the successor employer has
not restricted imposition of liability.   See Artistic Furniture, 9209
F.2d at 1327 (“There is, of course, no relevant economic
difference between the award of backpay or compensatory
damages at issue in our previous successor liability cases and the
11
delinquent contribution liability at issue here.”).  The
requirement of notice and the ability of the successor to shield
itself during negotiations temper concerns that imposing
successor liability might discourage corporate transactions.
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that the federal
policies underlying ERISA and the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 (“MPPAA”), Pub.L. 96-364, 94 Stat.
1208, “are no less important, and no less compel the imposition
of successor liability than do the policies animating the NLRA,
Title VII,” or the other statutes to which the doctrine has been
extended.   Id.  In light of the Seventh Circuit’s comprehensive
analysis, we need not reinvent the wheel.  Rather, we will
address some of the concerns raised by the District Court and
summarize the principal considerations that provide our ratio
decidendi.
A central policy goal underlying ERISA’s enactment
“was to protect plan participants and their beneficiaries.” 
Littlejohn, 155 F.3d at 208; see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) (“ERISA is a comprehensive statute
designed to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.”); Pittsburgh Mack
Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 580 F.3d
185, 194 (3d Cir. 2009) (ERISA was enacted to ensure “that
pension funds will be adequately funded, even when employers
withdraw from them, and that employees who are relying on
those funds will be protected.”); Becker v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,
281 F.3d 372, 381 (3d Cir. 2002) (“ERISA is designed to protect
benefits promised to an employee arising from a pre-existing
employment relationship.”).  Congress evinced a strong desire to
further protect participants when it enacted the MPPAA, which
amended ERISA to prevent “the adverse consequences that
result when individual employers terminate their participation or
withdraw” from multiemployer pension plans.  Supervalu, Inc. v.
Bd. of Trs., 500 F.3d 334, 336 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotations
omitted).
Statewide’s failure to pay contributions caused harm to
plan beneficiaries and changed the nature of the employment
relationship.  As the District Court noted during the settlement
12
hearing in January 2006, the Health and Welfare Fund
suspended benefits after the sale, leaving fifty-three union
workers and, in some cases, their families without health
insurance.  Absent imposition of successor liability on Ruberton,
other employers will be forced to make up the difference to
ensure that workers receive their entitled benefits.  If these
outcomes were permitted, it would contravene congressional
policy for multiemployer pension funds.  See Artistic Furniture,
920 F.2d at 1328 (providing an in depth discussion of the
legislative history).
The rule promulgated in Artistic Furniture comports with
our opinion in Littlejohn.  As noted above, we held in Littlejohn
that successor liability for delinquent ERISA fund contributions
could be imposed after a merger without notice.  In so doing, we
relied in part on the “almost universally accepted state law
principle that when two corporations merge, the surviving
corporation assumes the liabilities of the extinct corporation.”  
Littlejohn, 155 F.3d at 209.  Because the present case involves
an asset sale rather than a merger, the “universally accepted”
principle adopted in Littlejohn does not directly apply here.
However, Littlejohn established a framework by which to
determine successor liability under ERISA.  As we stated in
Littlejohn, “where the statute does not provide explicit
instructions, it is well settled that Congress intended that the
federal courts would fill in the gaps by developing, in light of
reason, experience, and common sense, a federal common law of
rights and obligations imposed by the statute.”  Id. at 208.  “Of
course, [we continued,] the federal common law must be
developed with ERISA’s policy goals in mind.”  Id.  Although
we relied in Littlejohn on the state common law rule of successor
liability for delinquent contributions in a merger, we did so
stressing that following state law in that context furthered
Congress’ goals in enacting ERISA.  See id. at 210 (adopting a
general rule of successor liability for mergers “demonstrates not
only its basis in reason but also that adopting it in this context
will further ERISA’s policy goal of protecting employee pension
plan participants and their beneficiaries”).  We are satisfied that
the Seventh Circuit gave proper weight to the policy
considerations that we held in Littlejohn govern the federal
13
common law of ERISA.
The District Court, and Ruberton on appeal, dwell on
language from Littlejohn to support a departure from Artistic
Furniture and the Golden State line of cases.  In Littlejohn, we
said that Golden State and its progeny were “somewhat
distinguishable because they dealt with the application of labor
law concepts and the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
to a corporation other than the signatory to the agreement,”
whereas, in Littlejohn the issue involved “the transfer of a valid
and ordinary debt  . . . which just happens to have its genesis in
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.”   Id. at 209.  The
District Court found that the balance of equities is different in a
suit to recover an “ordinary debt” because the unique employer-
employee relationship governed by federal labor law and policy
is not implicated as it is in an unfair labor practice suit.  Einhorn
v. M.L. Ruberton Const. Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 463, 474 (D.N.J.
2009).
We are unpersuaded.  Littlejohn is weak precedent for the
notion that an ERISA debt is merely “ordinary.”  In that case,
“the parties agree[d]  that only the transfer of a valid and
ordinary debt [was] at issue.”  155 F.3d at 209 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the court did not decide that an ERISA debt is ordinary;
the point was conceded and the court assumed it.  Neither the
Littlejohn court nor the District Court offered any further
justification for concluding that such a debt is merely
contractual.
There is more than a contractual arrangement at stake
here.  As the Artistic Furniture court observed, contribution
duties under ERISA are mandated by statute, with a special
federal cause of action for their enforcement.  920 F.2d at 1328
(citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1145, 1132).  Congress has thus adopted a
policy of protecting ERISA funds against delinquent
contributors to a degree that is greater than that afforded by the
common law of contracts.  This policy judgment alters the pre-
existing balance of considerations that led to the adoption of the
common law rule, which counsels in favor of expanding
successor liability.
14
Moreover, the considerations in Littlejohn are
distinguishable from the present case.  The issue in Littlejohn
focused on the requirement of notice.  This court was concerned
that requiring notice before a debt follows in the context of a
merger “would result in perverse incentives, encouraging the
survivor to not examine records and hide its head in the sand,”
and allow the disappearing entity to “unilaterally extinguish a
debt” by hiding it from the survivor.  Id. at 210 (emphasis in
original).  In the context of an asset sale, requiring notice would
have the opposite effect.  The successor-purchaser would have
incentive to inquire about the seller’s previous liabilities to
negotiate for a lower purchase price.  The predecessor-seller
would have incentive to disclose debts and find workable
solutions during the sale to release itself from liability and avoid
protracted dispute.
In its brief, Ruberton opines that “it would make little
sense for courts . . . to apply a narrow standard for determining
successor liability in ERISA cases involving mergers and an
expanded standard in cases involving assets sales – unless the
goal is to place a ‘thumb on the scales’ of justice to obtain a
particular result.”  Appellee’s Br. at 24.   Although we have
referred to the Artistic Furniture standard as the “expanded”
successorship doctrine, this is not entirely accurate.  On one
hand, the Artistic Furniture standard is more expansive than the
common law rule of successor liability because it does not
require commonality of ownership between the seller and buyer
for the continuance analysis (discussed infra).  On the other, the
Artistic Furniture standard is narrower than the common law
because it requires that a successor be put on notice before the
assumption of debt follows.  And, as Littlejohn instructs,
balancing the equities in light of federal labor policy is precisely
what we are supposed to do in successorship cases under
ERISA.  This may, as here, require that different standards apply
in different contexts.
The Artistic Furniture opinion comports with other
precedents of this court.  We have recognized that because
ERISA and the MPPAA are remedial statutes, they “should be
liberally construed in favor of protecting the participants in
employee benefit plans.”  IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker
15
& Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 1986). 
Moreover, as argued by Einhorn, in Cent. Pa. Teamsters Pension
Fund v. McCormick Dray Line, Inc., 85 F.3d 1098 (3d Cir.
1996), this court recognized that ERISA displaces traditional
common law principles in litigation brought to recover
delinquent contributions to multiemployer plans.  We held in
McCormick Dray that the defense of mutual mistake, valid under
the traditional common law, was not available in an ERISA suit
in order to effectuate federal labor policy as intended by
Congress.  Id. at 1106-07.  The principles set forth in
McCormick Dray support a departure from the common law rule
in the present case as well.
The District Court’s reliance on our decision in Polius v.
Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986), was misplaced. 
Polius involved a state products liability suit and does not
govern our analysis in the labor context.  Moreover, the notice
requirement obviates the concern we expressed in Polius, and
echoed by the District Court, that expanded liability would be
unforeseen and is likely to discourage corporate transactions.  As
we noted above, we do not agree that imposing liability will
negatively affect the liquidity of corporate assets.  As the
Supreme Court reasoned in Golden State, the seller’s
outstanding liabilities can be reflected in the purchase price, or
the successor may secure an indemnity clause in the sales
contract.  414 U.S. at 172 n.2.
A number of other circuit and district courts have
extended the Golden State rationale in actions seeking recovery
of delinquent pension fund contributions under ERISA after an
asset sale.  See Mass. Carpenters Cent. Collection Agency v.
Belmont Concrete Corp., 139 F.3d 304, 308 (1st Cir. 1998)
(citing Artistic Furniture, the court recognized that “[a]lthough
developed in the labor law context, alter ego or successor
liability analysis has been applied to claims involving employee
benefit funds brought under ERISA and the LMRA”); Stotter
Div. of Graduate Plastics Co., Inc. v. Dist. 65, United Auto
Workers, 991 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Artistic
Furniture, the court found that the arbitrator did not exceed his
authority by imposing liability on the successor-employer for
delinquent contributions owed under the predecessor’s CBA
 Ruberton cites to cases from the Fifth and Eighth circuits10
as inconsistent with expanded successorship liability under ERISA.
However, neither case provides persuasive or relevant authority.
See Greater Kan. City Laborers Pension Fund v. Superior Gen.
Contractors, Inc., 104 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1997) (case did not
involve an asset sale and issue was whether defendant was an alter
ego); Cen. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Funds v. PYA/Monarch
of Tex., Inc., 851 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff sued on narrow
grounds under the common law).
16
with a union); Haw. Carpenters Trust Funds v. Waiola
Carpenter Shop, Inc., 823 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1987) (in wake of
an asset sale, the court followed the substantial continuity test
for determining successor liability for delinquent contributions);
Bd. of Trs. of Unite Here Local 25 v. MR Watergate LLC, 677 F.
Supp. 2d 229, 231-32 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing Artistic
Furniture); Cent. Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund v. Bear Distrib.
Co. Inc., No. 07-CV-3554, 2009 WL 812224, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 26, 2009) (adopting the Artistic Furniture standard in an
analogous case); Trs. of the Utah Carpenters & Cement Masons
Pension Trust v. DAW, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-87 TC, 2009 WL
77856, at *3 (D. Utah Jan. 7, 2009) (following Artistic Furniture
finding buyer liable for seller’s withdrawal liability under
ERISA); see also 14 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 6755 (“federal courts
in the labor law field have taken a far more liberal approach
[than the common law] in imposing the obligations of a seller of
assets on the purchaser . . .  [including] where the predecessor
had failed to meet its payment obligations under a
multiemployer plan”) (citations omitted).  No court of appeals,
to our knowledge, has rejected the holding in Artistic
Furniture.10
In sum, we hold that a purchaser of assets may be liable
for a seller’s delinquent ERISA fund contributions to vindicate
important federal statutory policy where the buyer had notice of
the liability prior to the sale and there exists sufficient evidence
of continuity of operations between the buyer and seller.  The
inquiry should be effectuated on a case by case basis balancing
the equities presently before the court.  
We will remand this case to the District Court to apply
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the Golden State successorship doctrine to determine whether
Ruberton is liable for Statewide’s delinquencies to the Funds. 
At oral argument the parties did not dispute that the notice
requirement has been satisfied.  Artistic Furniture, 920 F.2d at
1329 (the notice inquiry centers on whether the buyer knows
about the debts, not whether the buyer knows that the funds
intend to seek recovery from it).  As such, the only issue on
remand will be whether Ruberton substantially continued
Statewide’s operations.
Under the substantial continuity test courts look to, inter
alia, the following factors: continuity of the workforce,
management, equipment and location; completion of work
orders begun by the predecessor; and constancy of customers. 
See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27,
43 (1987); Artistic Furniture, 920 F.2d at 1329.  This analysis
differs from the traditional common law de facto merger and
mere continuation exceptions because commonality of
ownership is not required.  See Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull
Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 467-69 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the
factors for determining whether a transaction is a de facto
merger or continuation, including continuity of shareholders);
Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d
1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 1997) (“a purchaser of assets will not be
liable under the theory of de facto merger or mere continuation
in the absence of continuity of ownership”) (quotations omitted).
The parties dispute whether Ruberton continued
Statewide’s business and, if so, to what extent.  For example,
Ruberton argues that “even if Ruberton were deemed to have
continued Statewide’s business, that continuation would be
limited to the guide rail, fencing and signage business” covered
by the Local 676 CBA and it could not be liable for
contributions owed in connection with Statewide’s other CBAs. 
Appellee’s Br. at 9 n.4.  The presence of a factual dispute
renders summary judgment at this juncture for either party
inappropriate and this question is best resolved by the District
Court.
IV.
For the reasons set forth, we will vacate the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ruberton, and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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